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ABSTRACT
We construct a random matching model of a monetary economy with commodity money in the
form of potentially diﬀerent types of silver coins that are distinguishable by the quantity of metal
they contain. The quantity of silver in the economy is assumed to be ﬁxed, but agents can mint
and melt coins. Coins yield no utility, but can be traded. Uncoined silver yields direct utility to the
holder. We ﬁnd that optimal coin size increases with the probability of trade and with the stock
of silver. We use these predictions of our model to analyze the coinage decisions of the monetary
authorities in medieval Venice and England. Our model provides theoretical support for the view
that decisions about coin sizes and types during the medieval period reﬂected a desire to improve
the economic welfare of the general population, not just the desire for seigniorage revenue.
∗The ﬁgures are best viewed in color. We thank Miguel Molico, Fran¸ cois Velde, Randy Wright, and partici-
pants at seminars at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the University of British Columbia, Yale University
and the University of Oxford for helpful comments. Redish gratefully acknowledges the support of the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Any study of the money supply [of medieval Europe] needs to take account not only of
the total face value of the currency, but also of the metals and denominations of which it is
composed. (Mayhew (2004), p. 82)
For nearly a millennium, European monetary systems were based on commodities,
speciﬁcally silver or gold and silver coinage. Theoretical understanding of commodity money
systems most often derives from the 19th-century gold standard and is founded on a quantity
theory approach to money, which focuses on the role of the quantity of the commodity in
setting the price level and the neutrality of changes in that quantity for changes in output.
Such theorizing misses much of the richness of monetary history. Economists, his-
torians, and numismatists have identiﬁed numerous challenges that faced the monetary au-
thorities of medieval Europe, including dealing with bullion famines (and feasts) and the
scarcity or surfeit of small change. The quantity theory of money is inherently unable to
address these issues for a commodity money system. It assumes that the supply of money is
controlled by a monetary authority, at least indirectly, and that money is perfectly divisible.
Further, it does not explicitly model the medium of exchange function of money.
In this paper, we take a diﬀerent approach to analyzing commodity money systems.
We build a random matching model of monetary exchange in which agents need to use
coins as a medium of exchange to buy (perishable) goods. We assume an exogenously ﬁxed
quantity of a non-perishable good (silver) that can be held in a utility-yielding form (which
we call “jewelry”) or can be held as coins that do not yield utility directly but can be traded
with other agents. Agents can acquire coins (at a cost) by taking jewelry to the mint or can
acquire jewelry by melting coins. The monetary authority determines the size of (amount of
silver in) a coin and the number of types of coins in existence. Using numerical examples,
we show that the weight of silver per coin matters for economic welfare and that changes
in the frequency of trading opportunities and in the quantity of monetary metal aﬀect the
optimal coin size.
We then use the model to analyze the choices of coin size in Venice and England
through the Middle Ages. These two locations are used in part because they are relatively
well documented and in part because they represent two diﬀerent economic environments.
Both regions became urbanized in the Middle Ages, but Venice more so and earlier. Both
regions also experienced an inﬂux of silver — again earlier in the case of Venice. In the
context of our model, such diﬀerences and changes in the economic environment would
imply that diﬀerent coin sizes would maximize social welfare. We show that the monetary
authorities in the two regions changed the types of coins issued in the way that the model
predicts would have increased social welfare. In other words, our model provides theoretical
support for the view that decisions about coin sizes during the medieval period reﬂected, at
least in part, a desire to improve the economic welfare of the general population, not just
the desire for seigniorage revenue on the part of the sovereign.
Our model is closely related to that of Velde and Weber (2000) and Lee, Wallace, and
Zhu (2005). Velde and Weber (2000) model a commodity money system allowing agents to
hold monetary metal as coins or in a form that yields direct utility. The demand for money
in their model is driven by a cash-in-advance constraint. Lee, Wallace, and Zhu (2005)
build a random matching model in which agents can hold multiple units of various types
of ﬁat money. Agents engage in pair-wise trade alternately with periods where they canrebalance their portfolio subject only to a wealth constraint. They prove the existence of
a monetary steady state in which agents trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of small denomination notes
for transacting against their higher handling costs. As in Lee, Wallace, and Zhu (2005), we
motivate the demand for money with a random matching model. However, our agents use a
commodity money and thus there is an additional margin — the marginal utility of jewelry
— that bears on how many coins an agent wants to hold.
In a previous paper (Redish and Weber (2011)), we built a random matching monetary
model with two indivisible coins and illustrated that a small change shortage could exist in
the sense that adding small coins to the economy with large coins was welfare improving.
However, in that paper we assumed a ﬁxed quantity of coins of each type and compared the
characteristics of equilibria with diﬀerent stocks and sizes of coins. The commodity value of
the coins was imposed by assuming that each coin paid a dividend (essentially was a Lucas
tree). In this paper we endogenize the quantity of money by permitting minting and melting.
Thus the model combines a more fundamental way of generating valued commodity money
with an endogenous quantity of money (though not an endogenous quantity of monetary
metal), thereby providing a much richer framework in which to discuss medieval monetary
systems.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the types of silver
coinage produced in the mints of Venice and England between 800 and 1400. Section 2
then presents a model of a monetary system that enables us to evaluate the consequences
of diﬀerent denomination structures. Section 3 presents some characteristics of the steady
state of the model. Section 4 then uses the results to argue that the changes in denomination
structure in medieval Venice and England are consistent with those that would have been
welfare-improving responses to the changing economic environment: the expansion in mar-
kets and the rising stock of silver. Section 5 contrasts our results with those in the literature.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
1. The monetary system
From the time of Charlemagne until the end of the 12th century, European govern-
ments essentially minted only a single type of coin variously called the denarius, denier, or
penny depending on the location.1 Charlemagne standardized the coinage of the many mints
in the Holy Roman Empire with a denarius of high ﬁneness, a diameter of about 18 mm.,
and a weight of about 1.7 grams. The English, not part of the empire, also minted a silver
coin that was similar in ﬁneness and weight to the denarius. Although pennies were the
sole coin minted, accounts often used the collective noun shilling (or sol) to refer to a dozen
pennies, and pound (or lire) to refer to a score of dozens (240 pence).
The uniformity that Charlemagne imposed did not outlive him. Within the empire,
counts began operating their mints on their own account, and throughout Europe minting
rights were assumed by bishops and seigneurs (the origin of the term “seignorage”) who
became the local monetary authority. Each monetary authority chose the weight and ﬁneness
1Some German states issued very diﬀerent coins called “bracteates” that were thin, had a large diameter,
and were stamped only on one face. A few states that issued deniers also minted obols — half deniers —
however, the extent of this coinage is hard to know. We follow Favier (1998), p. 127, who speaks of “the
single denomination the denier and nothing but the denier.”
2Table 1: The penny coinages of the late 12th century
Year Weight Fineness Fine weight
England 1160 1.46 gms .925 1.35 gms
Cologne 1160 1.4 gms .925 1.30 gms
Paris 1160 1.28–0.85 gms < .5 < .60 gms
Melgueil 1125 1.1 gms .42 0.46 gms
Lucca 1160 0.6 gms 0.6 0.36 gms
Barcelona 1160 0.66 gms 0.2 0.13 gms
Venice 1160 0.1 gms ﬁne
Note: a U.S. dime weighs 2.268 grams.
Source: Spuﬀord (1988), pp. 102–3. Lane and Mueller (1985), p. 527.
of the penny that it minted, and all diminished both but to very diﬀerent extents. By the
mid-12th century, the characteristics of the penny ranged widely (see Table 1) from the
English penny, weighing 1.46 grams and 92.5% ﬁne, to the many French coins weighing
about 1 gram and about 35% ﬁne, to the Italian coins that were about one-quarter of a
gram and less than 30% ﬁne (Spuﬀord (1988), pp. 102–3).
The use of a single type of coin in an economy made payments of both small and large
amounts diﬃcult. In England, for example, the daily wage for a laborer in 1250 was roughly
one penny (Britnell (2004), p. 24), and a penny would buy 9 or 10 gallons of ale or four
1 pound loaves of bread. Throughout Europe the options for paying large values were also
limited. There were some Byzantine gold coins, particularly in the South of Europe. Silver
ingots, stamped with their ﬁneness and often weighing an integer number of marks (a mark
weighed about 220 grams), were used on occasion. But even for large payments, pennies
were used, frequently in sealed bags certiﬁed for their contents. Spuﬀord (1988) p. 210 cites
the example of the papal collector for northern Europe who collected over 70,000 marks in
pence (close to 1 million pence!), as well as over 1,000 marks in ingots for remittance to the
pope.
The practice of minting only a single type of coin ended in Italy in the last decade of
the 12th century. In 1190 the Milanese began minting a grosso that was of high ﬁneness and
weighed over 2 grams. This coin only circulated locally, but a few years later the Venetians
began minting a similar coin which circulated widely. The Venetian grosso contained roughly
24 times as much silver as the denari that were in circulation. The French followed suit (see
Table 2), introducing the gros tournois in 1266.
The English, in contrast, did not issue a larger coin until much later. Instead, begin-
ning in 1279, the Royal Mint issued two smaller coins that were fractions of a penny: the
halfpenny and farthing (quarter penny). England did not issue a coin larger than the penny
until the groat in 1351.2
2The mint ordinance of 1279 allowed the minting of groats. However, numismatists argue that essentially
none were minted between 1279 and 1344; see Section 4.2 below.
3Table 2: The introduction of new silver coins, 13th and 14th centuries
Coin Metal Fine weight Value in
unit of account
Venice
1172 Denarius Silver .10 gms 1d
1194 Grossus Silver 2.1 gms 24d
1284 Grossus Silver 2.1 gms 32d
France
1200 Denier Silver 0.36 gms 1d
1266 Gros tournois Silver 4.2 gms 12d
England
1200 Penny Silver 1.4 gms 1d
1279 Farthing Silver .34 gms .25d
1351 Groat Silver 4.33 gms 4d
Sources: Lane and Mueller (1985), de Wailly (1857), Challis (1992).
2. The Model
A. Environment
We build a random matching model in which agents are permitted to hold multiple
numbers of each of two types of coins. The model has discrete time and an inﬁnite number
of periods. There is a nonstorable, perfectly divisible good and a durable commodity, silver.
There are m ounces of silver per capita in existence.
The way in which we model commodity money follows that used by Velde and Weber
(2000). We assume that silver can be held in either of two forms, which we refer to as coins
and jewelry. Silver held in the form of jewelry yields utility directly to the holder, whereas
silver held in the form of coins yields no utility to the holder. Only coins can be traded,
because of diﬃculties in determining the weight and ﬁneness of jewelry. There is a per-period
utility cost γ of holding a coin that is independent of the size of the coin.
The technological limitations on minting in the medieval period placed restrictions on
what the monetary authority could do with coinage. Coins could not be too small, because
of the possibility of loss. Also, they could not be too heavy or they would be diﬃcult to carry.
Further, diﬃculties in determining weight and ﬁneness imposed restrictions on how similar
diﬀerent types of coins could be. The role of the monetary authority in this environment
was to choose how many ounces of metal to put into a coin and how many types of coins to
mint subject to these limitations.
In our model, we allow for the minting of two types of silver coin distinguished by the
weight of silver in each coin. We let b1 be the ounces of silver that it puts in the ﬁrst silver
coin, and b2 = ηb1 be the amount of silver in the second coin, where η is an integer greater
than one. As was the case with coins throughout most of the time during which commodity
monies were used, these coins do not have denominations. They are simply an amount of
silver that has been turned into coins with some type of standardized markings that allow
one type of coin to be easily diﬀerentiated from a diﬀerent type of coin.
4Each period in the model is divided into two subperiods. In the ﬁrst subperiod agents
can trade in bilateral matches. At the beginning of this subperiod, an agent has a probability
1
2 of being a consumer but not a producer and the same probability of being a producer but
not a consumer. This assumption rules out double coincidence matches, and therefore gives
rise to the essentiality of a medium of exchange.
After agents’ types (consumer or producer) are revealed, a fraction θ0 ∈ (0,1] of
agents are randomly matched bilaterally. In a match, the portfolios of both agents are
known. However, past trading histories are private information, and agents are anonymous.
These assumptions rule out gift-giving equilibria and the use of credit. Thus, trading can
occur only through the use of media of exchange, which is the role that the silver coins can
play.
In the second subperiod, agents can alter their mix of the two types of silver coins
and jewelry by minting or melting. That is, in the second subperiod agents can change the
form in which they hold the stock of silver, but they cannot change the total quantity in the
economy.
B. Consumer choices
There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents in the model that maximize
expected discounted lifetime utility. The discount factor is β. Let c be the quantity of the
good consumed; q, the quantity of the good produced; and j, the holdings of silver jewelry
in terms of units of the small coin. The agent’s period preferences are
u(c) − q + µ(b1j)
with u(0) = 0, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and u0(0) = ∞. The disutility of good production is assumed
to be linear without loss of generality. We assume that an agent’s utility from holding silver
jewelry is µ(b1j) with µ0 > 0, µ00 < 0. Let s1 and s2 be an agent’s holdings of small and
large silver coins, respectively. The agent’s portfolio of metal holdings is y = {(s1,s2,j) :
s1,s2,j,∈ N}.
We assume that in a single coincidence pairwise meeting, the potential consumer gets
to make a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) oﬀer to the potential seller. This oﬀer is the triple
(q,p1,p2), where q ∈ <+ is the quantity of production demanded and pi ∈ Z is the quantity
of silver coins of type i oﬀered. Oﬀers with p1 < 0 can be thought of as the seller being
asked to make change.
Let v(y) : N
N
N → <+ be the expected value of an agent’s portfolio at the beginning
of the second subperiod. The set of feasible TIOLI oﬀers is a combination of output and
coins that is a feasible coin oﬀer and satisﬁes the condition that the seller be no worse oﬀ
than not trading. We denote this set by Γ(y, ˜ y),
Γ(y, ˜ y) = {(q,p1,p2) : q ∈ <+,−˜ s1 ≤ p1 ≤ s1,−˜ s2 ≤ p2 ≤ s2,
−q + v(˜ s1 + p1, ˜ s2 + p2,˜ j) ≥ v(˜ y)},
where a˜denotes the seller. In the second subperiod, the agent can mint or melt. Deﬁne
zi ∈ Z to be the quantity of silver coins of type i minted (> 0) or melted (< 0). Agents
cannot melt more coins than they have, and agents cannot mint more coins than they have
5metal in the form of jewelry. Note that this does not prevent them from melting coins of
one type and minting coins of the other from the metal gained by melting. Denote the set
of minting and melting choices available to an agent by Ω(y):
Ω(y) = {(z1,z2) : zi ≥ −si,z1 + ηz2 ≤ j}.
Agents can melt coins without incurring a cost. However, if agents mint, they incur a
seigniorage cost S(z1,z2;j). To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that no metal is lost
by an agent when minting. Instead, we assume that the seigniorage an agent has to pay is
in terms of utility, but does depend on how many coins are minted.
C. Equilibrium
The three components needed are the value functions (Bellman equations), the asset
transition equations, and the market clearing conditions. We proceed to describe each in
turn.
Value functions
Let wt(yt) and vt(yt) be the expected values of holding yt at the beginning of the ﬁrst
and second subperiods of period t, respectively. The Bellman equation at the beginning of
the second subperiod is
vt(yt) = max
(z1t,z2t)∈Ω(yt)
{βwt+1(s1t + z1t,s2t + z2t,jt − z1t − ηz2t) − S(z1t,z2t;jt)}.






[u(qt) + vt(s1t − p1t,s2t − p2t,jt)]
+(1 − θ)vt(yt) + µ(b1jt) − γ(s1t + s2t),
where πt(yt) is the fraction of agents with yt at the beginning of the ﬁrst subperiod and
θ = θ0
2 . The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the expected payoﬀ from being a buyer
in a single coincidence meeting, which occurs with probability θ. The second term is the
expected payoﬀ either from being the seller in a single coincidence meeting or from not have
a meeting. The third term is the utility from holding silver jewelry, and the ﬁnal term is the
utility cost of carrying silver coins.
Asset holdings
Deﬁne λb(k1,k2;yt, ˜ yt) to be the probability that a buyer with yt meeting a seller with
˜ yt leaves with s1 − p1 = k1 and s2 − p2 = k2. That is,
λ




1 if k1 = s1 − p1(y, ˜ y) and k2 = s2 − p2(y, ˜ y)
0 otherwise.
Deﬁne λs(k1,k2;yt, ˜ yt) similarly for the seller.







b(k1,k2;yt, ˜ yt) + λ
s(k1,k2;yt, ˜ yt)]
+(1 − 2θ)πt(k1,k2,j),
where 0 denotes the beginning of the second subperiod. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
is the fraction of single coincidence meetings in which the buyer leaves with k1 small silver
coins and k2 large silver coins. The second term is the fraction of such meetings in which
the seller leaves with k1 small silver coins and k2 large silver coins. The ﬁnal term is the
probability that no meeting occurs, in which case no coins change hands.
Next deﬁne δ(k1,k2,h,yt) to be the probability an agent with yt after trade has
s1 + z1 = k1, s2 + z2 = k2, and j − z1 − ηz2 = h after minting or melting. Then the
















y π0(y) = 1.
Market clearing
The market clearing condition is that the stock of silver metal must be held. That is,
X
y
b1(s1 + ηs2 + j)π(y) = m.
Deﬁnition 1. Steady state equilibrium: A steady state equilibrium is value functions
w,v; asset holdings π and π0; and quantities p1,p2,z1,z2,q that satisfy the value functions,
the asset transition equations, and market clearing.
3. Results
We are unable to prove the existence of steady state equilibria or to obtain analytic
results for our model. Therefore, we rely on computed equilibria for numerical examples
to obtain our results. Speciﬁcally, we assume u(q) = q1/4,µ(b1j) = 0.05(b1j)1/2,β = 0.9,
and γ = 0.001. Because we are interested in the eﬀects of changes in the size of coins,
urbanization, and the stock of silver, we consider various values for b1,η,θ, and m.
To avoid problems in keeping track of the quantity of silver in the economy, we deﬁne
seigniorage in terms of foregone utility from holding jewelry. Speciﬁcally, we assume
S(z1t,z2t;jt) = max{µ(b1jt) − µ[b1jt − b1σ(z1t + ηz2t)],0},
where σ is the seigniorage rate. The term µ(b1jt) is the utility from holding jewelry before
doing any minting. The term µ[b1jt−b1σ(z1t+ηz2t)] is the utility from holding that amount
of jewelry less the amount of jewelry given up to pay the seigniorage tax on minting coins
from jewelry. The max with 0 is because seigniorage is only paid on minting. We use a
7seigniorage rate of σ = 0.04, which was approximately the average seigniorage rate on silver
during this period.
A. Single silver coin
Because of the long period in which there was only a single silver coin in medieval
Europe and to get some intuition about how the model works, we begin by studying our
economy when there is only a single silver coin. Ex ante welfare in this economy depends
upon the size of the coin.3 This is shown in Figure 1.4 We assume θ = 1/3 and m = 0.1 for
this example.
The optimal size coin is b1 = 0.009. It reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between the amount an
agent can get in a trade and the cost of carrying a coin. Having a single large-size coin
in the economy saves on handling costs, but it means that potential buyers with coins are
willing to trade only if they encounter a potential seller who is willing to produce a large
quantity of output. Such meetings occur infrequently, because the only potential sellers who
are willing to produce a large quantity of output are those with small holdings of silver
wealth. In contrast, a small-size coin increases handling costs, but means that potential
buyers are willing to trade when they encounter potential sellers who are willing to produce
a smaller quantity of output. Such meetings occur more frequently, because there is a larger
fraction of such potential sellers. Note that handling costs are critical in the determination
of optimal coin size. For example, if γ were equal to zero, then it would be optimal to make
the coin inﬁnitely small.
Because the types of trades that occur diﬀer depending on the size of the coin for the
reasons just stated, the distribution of coin and jewelry holdings depends on the size of the
coin. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows coin and jewelry holdings for coin sizes of
b1 = 0.009 and b1 = 0.015. The ﬁgure shows that with a larger coin there are more agents
who do not have coins, implying that fewer trading opportunities are available. It also shows
that, for any level of silver holdings (in terms of units of coins, not ounces of metal), agents
hold more silver wealth in the form of jewelry and less in the form of coins when the larger
coin is the only one in existence.
It is also useful to examine how the distribution of welfare changes with coin size.
This is done in Figure 3, where we plot the cumulative distribution of agents by their welfare
for coin sizes of b1 = 0.009 and b1 = 0.015. The measure of agents in the economy with
low levels of welfare increases with coin size, and the measure of agents with high levels
of welfare decreases. Further, the measures of gainers and losers are not necessarily equal.
Even though ex ante welfare is higher when b1 = 0.009, only 40% of agents experience a
higher level of welfare. One way to interpret this result is the following. Suppose a vote
were taken but agents did not know where they would end up in the welfare distribution (ex
ante welfare). Then they would prefer b1 = 0.009. However, if agents knew that they would
end up at the same point in the cumulative welfare distribution, then the majority would
3Throughout the analysis, our welfare criterion is ex ante welfare, computed as ¯ w =
P
y π(y)w(y). For
comparison, we note that ex ante welfare in an economy in which a planner could instruct agents to give gifts
of the optimal quantity of output q∗ = 0.1575 is ¯ w = 1.733. Welfare in the planner economy is higher because
agents could use all the silver for utility-yielding jewelry and because the level of output produced/exchanged
would not depend on the coin-holdings of each party.
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Figure 2: Distribution of coin and jewelry holdings, b1 = 0.009 and b1 = 0.015
9prefer b1 = 0.015. An implication is that if the monetary authority puts more weight on
the wealthy, as might be the case for a sovereign who favors nobles over peasants, it might













Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of silver holdings, b1 = 0.009 and b1 = 0.015
B. Two coins
We turn now to the case in which the monetary authorities permit the minting of
coins of two diﬀerent sizes. The agents who carry silver jewelry to the mint can opt for large
or small silver coins, and equally can melt large or small coins into jewelry. In Figure 4 the
curves depict ex ante welfare in an economy with two coin types where the second coin’s
weight is η = 3 times that of the original coin. Again, we assume θ = 1/3 and m = 0.1.
The ﬁgure illustrates a number of features of the model.
1. If the monetary authority picks coin sizes optimally (conditional on η), then ex ante
welfare is higher if there are two coin types than if there is just one. A second, large
coin potentially reduces the carrying cost of any given amount of coin wealth that an
agent wants to hold.
2. The optimal coin sizes in two coin economies span the size of the optimal coin in a
single coin economy. For example, if there are two coins and the larger weighs three
times as much as the original coin, the ex ante welfare maximizing single coin is of size
b1 = 0.009 and the two coins have sizes b1 = 0.007 and b2 = 0.021.
3. Introducing a second coin does not always raise ex ante welfare. For example, consider
an economy with a single coin of size b1 = 0.006. Ex ante welfare is higher than in an
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Figure 4: Optimal coin sizes if there are two coins
11compare an economy with a single coin of optimal size (b1 = 0.009) with an economy
with that coin and a smaller one, b1 = 0.003. This is true even though the amount of
each coin minted is endogenous in both cases. That is, even though agents would be
better oﬀ as a group, in an ex ante sense, if they minted no small coins when given the
chance, it is in their individual interests to mint them.
4. Historical application of the model
We now use the model to analyze the choices of coin size in Venice and in England
through the Middle Ages. These two regions represent very diﬀerent aspects of the medieval
European economy. Venice, one of several city-states in Northern Italy, was a prosperous
city beneﬁtting from ties with the dynamic Mediterranean economy. The city was ruled by a
mercantile elite. In contrast to the fragmented Italian city-states, England was a centralized
polity by the High Middle Ages, ruled by a monarch, and where the landed nobility held
more power than the mercantile class.
Two of the most important changes in the economic environment in the Middle Ages
were the growth of urbanization and increases in silver mining. We brieﬂy describe these
changes and how their impact diﬀered in extent and chronology between Venice and England.
We then show how such changes would aﬀect the optimal coin size in our model. We ﬁnd that
the observed changes in the coinage in Venice and England correspond to the changes that
would raise welfare in our model. On this basis, we argue that as the economic environment
changed, the optimal coin size changed and that this inﬂuenced the monetary authorities’
choice of coin sizes. In other words, our model supports the view that decisions about coin
sizes during the medieval period reﬂected, at least in part, a desire to improve the economic
welfare of the general population and explicates the mechanisms whereby it did so.
A. Urbanization and the reduction in coin sizes
Economic historians have described the “renaissance of markets” between the 10th
and 13th centuries in Europe as a process that began in Northern Italy and spread gradually
and intermittently to the Low Countries, France, and England (e.g., Epstein (2009), ch. 4).
Outside the Muslim territories in Europe, Northern Italy was the most prosperous
European region in AD 1000 with a highly urbanized population and an emerging commercial
sector. By the 11th century, perhaps as much as 14% of the population lived in cities of
more than 10,000 (compared with 10% in Belgium and less than 5% in the British Isles and
France (Van Zanden (2009), p. 40). Venice was one of the four richest cities in the region
(the others: Genoa, Milan, and Florence) with a population estimated at 45,000 in AD 1000.
Over the next three centuries, the population rose to 110,000 as the city grew with expanding
Mediterranean trade and Venice became the major entrepot for the Levantine trade.
The acceleration of commercial activity and urbanization in England came much
later than that in Venice. At the beginning of the 13th century, the population of London
is estimated to have been 40,000 (Chandler (1987)). Starting then and continuing through
the 13th century, economic activity in England expanded with the population increasing and
the growing wool trade and urbanization accompanying an expansion of commercial activity.
In his study of the growth in the number of market towns between 1200 and 1349, Britnell
(1981) shows that over the period 1200 to 1350 the most rapid expansion (in number and
activity) occurred in the 25 years between 1250 and 1274.
12If we interpret changes in urbanization as increases in the frequency of trading oppor-
tunities available to agents, we can evaluate their eﬀect on optimal size in our model. The
frequency of trading opportunities aﬀects the optimal coin size as shown in Figure 5. As













Figure 5: Optimal coin size for diﬀerent amounts of trading
When trade is very infrequent (small θ), agents do not want to hold much silver in the
form of coins and would prefer to keep their wealth in utility-yielding jewelry. Small-sized
coins permit them to do this while still aﬀording them the opportunity to trade when they
happen to be the buyer in a single coincidence match. As trade becomes more frequent,
agents are willing to hold more wealth in the form of coins, and the cost of using small
coins (γ) starts to matter more, leading them to want larger coins. After some point, here
θ = 0.1, however, the increasing amount of trade means that the ﬂexibility in the oﬀers more
than oﬀsets the handling cost of more coins, and so agents would prefer a smaller coin (on
average).
The coinage changes mandated by the Venetian and English monetary authorities are
consistent with welfare-enhancing responses to urbanization predicted by our model. Further,
also consistent with our model, the diﬀerences in the timing and extent of urbanization caused
these responses to occur at diﬀerent times in the two locations.
In the case of Venice, the growth of commercial activity occurred between AD 1000
and AD 1200. It was accompanied by the gradual but cumulatively large reduction in the
silver content of the denarius from 1.6 grams to approximately 0.1 grams.
The change in English coinage was later and of a diﬀerent nature. Before the 13th
century there was very little reduction in the silver content of the penny, and by 1200
13the English penny contained roughly 14 times as much silver as the Venetian denarius.
In 1279, right after the period of expansion that Britnell (1981) highlights, the English
did begin to mint coins with less silver, but rather than debasing the single coin, they
began minting additional coins containing 0.67 grams (halfpence) and 0.33 grams (farthings)
of ﬁne silver. Notice that even after 1279, the smallest English coin (the farthing) had
considerably more silver than the denarius. This may reﬂect the fact that Northern Italy
was still more urbanized than England. It is also consistent with our ﬁnding (in Section 3.1)
that a monetary authority that favors the wealthy (e.g., the landed elite in England) would
choose a larger coin size than a more egalitarian monetary authority.
B. Silver inﬂows and the introduction of large silver coins
Available evidence suggests that the quantity of silver in Europe was relatively static
until the mid-12th century. This changed in approximately 1160 with the discovery and
exploitation of silver mines at Freiberg (in what is now Germany).5 Indeed, Spuﬀord (1988)
titled the relevant chapter of his seminal monetary history of medieval Europe “New silver,
c.1160–1320.” The new silver found its way ﬁrst to the Italian cities, the most commercialized
and trade-oriented part of the continent, and particularly to Venice, the nearest city to the
mines (Lane and Mueller (1985), p. 138).
The new silver found its way to England more slowly. Direct balance of payments
evidence is not available, but estimates of the money stock provide indirect evidence of this
timing. Figure 6 uses the estimates of Allen (2001) for the amount of coin in circulation and
of Clark (2007) for the English population. The ﬁgure shows a tripling of coin stocks per
capita between 1279 and 1310.
Figure 7 shows how the size of the silver coin aﬀects the ex ante welfare for various
levels of the stock of metal per capita (m). When there is more silver, agents are wealthier
on average, and they would choose to hold more silver both in the form of coins and in the
form of jewelry. A larger size coin allows them to do this with lower handling costs, so that
optimal coin size increases with m when there is only a single coin in the economy.6
However, our model suggests that there is a better response to increasing the size or
the single coin. This is to add a second, larger coin. Consider an economy in which there is
a single coin of size b1 = 0.009. If the monetary authority adds a second coin that is three
times as large as the existing coin when the per capita stock of silver doubles, it will raise
welfare relative to the option of minting only a single coin even if the size of that coin is
chosen optimally. This is shown in Figure 8.
Once again, the coinage changes mandated by the Venetian and English monetary
authorities are consistent with welfare-enhancing responses to the increasing stocks of silver
in the High Middle Ages. Venice started minting a new large “great” silver coin — the grosso
— in the last decade of the 12th century, shortly after the discovery of silver in Freiburg.
The grosso contained approximately 24 times as much silver as the denarius. England, which
5As numismatists and historians note, while rough measures of the quantity of silver mined can be
estimated, the initial stock is not known. The conclusion as to the signiﬁcance of the increase in part rests
on the anecdotal discussion of contemporaries and on the change in volume of activity at mints.
6Figure 7 makes it appear that optimal coin size increases proportionately with m. This is not true in
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Figure 8: Welfare gains from a second coin
received the inﬂow of silver later, introduced the groat in 1351. The groat contained about
4 times as much silver as a penny (and still had more than twice the silver content of the
grosso).7 Interestingly, in England the mint indenture of 1279 had made provision for the
minting of groats, but few (probably none) were minted. There were no complaints of a
groat scarcity.
5. Relation to other explanations
We have argued that the major changes to the types of coin in circulation in Europe
in the Middle Ages can be seen as eﬀorts to adjust the coinage to the external economic
environment. Here we compare our explanations for the diﬀerential experience of debasement
and for the timing of the introduction of large silver coins in Italy and England with those
currently in the literature.
A. Explanations for debasements
The most commonly accepted view of debasements is that they were driven by ﬁscal
motives. For example, Epstein (2009) (p. 233) described debasement of the silver currency
as “a source of proﬁts, as a literal means to make money,” and Hunt and Murray (1999) (p.
127) described medieval governments which “sought to raise funds by debasing the coinage,
the medieval equivalent of printing money.” In addition, Spuﬀord (1988) titled the chapter
of his monetary history that describes debasements in the 13th to 15th centuries as “The
7Similarly, France introduced the gros in 1266. Large silver coins (called variously groschen, gros, etc.)
were introduced in the Low Countries and Rhineland in the mid-14th century. See Grierson (1991).
16Scourge of Debasement.” He argued that “debasement was, of course, generally a byproduct
of war,” with the exception being “occasional minor downward adjustments in the weight of
new coins dictated by the state of wear of the coinage already in circulation” (p. 289).
Historians of Venice have been much more nuanced, however, and have argued that the
gradual debasement of the denarius between AD 800 and AD 1200 was not ﬁscally motivated,
but was a reasonable response to economic expansion that exceeded the growth of monetary
metal. One example is Cipolla (1963). He argued that the dramatic growth of the Italian
population between the mid-9th and mid-13th centuries and simultaneous increase in the
division of labor signiﬁcantly increased the demand for money. Since the supply of precious
metals did not expand proportionately to the increase in the demand for money, there would
have been a “dangerous downward movement of prices” had not measures been taken “to
reduce the ﬁneness of the coinage and increase the number of pieces in circulation.”8
Our model enables us to evaluate Cipolla’s analysis. To do so, we compare the optimal
coin size (conditional on a ﬁxed quantity of monetary metal) in two economies with diﬀerent
matching probabilities (diﬀerent θ). This is done in Table 3. The ﬁrst row of the table shows
average price in terms of coins (¯ p), average price in terms of ounces of silver (b1¯ p), average
coin holdings, and ex ante welfare for an economy with θ = 1/9 and a coin size of b1 = 0.015,
which is the optimal size coin for this economy.9 The next row shows the same items when
θ has increased to 1/3, but the size of the coin is unchanged. The ﬁnal row shows the same
items for θ = 1/3, but with a smaller coin size of b1 = 0.009, which is the optimal size coin
for that economy.
A comparison of the second row with the third shows shows that Cipolla is correct
about two points. First, the number of silver coins in circulation is larger with the smaller
coin. Second, the average price, in terms of both silver and the number of coins, is higher
with the smaller coin.
However, even though our model’s predictions accord with what Cipolla asserts would
happen in the absence of debasement, the mechanisms are entirely diﬀerent. He seems to
take a quantity theory view with the money stock being the quantity of coins in existence.
The increase in this money stock is required to keep the price level in terms of coins from
falling when output increases. He seems not to recognize that under his outcome there would
be still deﬂation in the sense that the price of output in terms of silver would have decreased.
In contrast, in our model, the price of output in terms of silver depends on how valuable
silver is as jewelry relative to how valuable it is expected to be if turned into coins. The
price of output in terms of coins depends on how much metal is in the coin.
Lane and Mueller (1985) (p. 25), in their seminal history of money in Venice, argue,
8Also note that while Cipolla (1963) argued that the supply of precious metal was inelastic, he discussed
the availability of metal through trade rather than the other margin that was closer to home, the undoubted
availability of silver in the form of plate.








The average number of coins traded appears exceedingly large at ﬁrst glance. However, it must be remem-
bered that the calculation is coins per unit of output. For our parameterization, the optimal output in a
trade is only q∗ = 0.1575 and the vast amount of trades involved levels of output well below this level.
17Table 3: The eﬀect of changes in θ and coin sizes
Coin size Average price Average price Average coin Welfare
θ (b1) in coins (¯ p) in ounces of silver (b1¯ p) holdings
1/9 .015 47.4 0.711 1.74 0.531
1/3 .015 12.9 0.193 1.28 1.52
1/3 .009 27.3 0.246 2.24 1.56
“The above-mentioned debasement of imperial pennies by Italian mints from the ninth cen-
tury to the twelfth has usually been attributed to the greed and completion of local lords,
but it probably was in the public interest, because it met a growing need for coin that arose
from the increased use of markets and the general expansion of trade.” The predictions of
our model support their explanation.
B. Explanations for the introduction of larger coins
We have argued that the large silver coins were introduced because of an increase in
the stock of monetary metal in western Europe, an increase that was experienced ﬁrst in
Northern Italy and later in England. The conventional explanation for the introduction of
large coins has focused more on urbanization and the expansion of the urban workforce as
the relevant exogenous change.
In his article explaining the introduction of the grosso, Grierson (1979) attributed the
new coin to the necessity of paying wages for the construction of ships for the Fourth Crusade
in 1200. For the English case, Spuﬀord (1988) speciﬁcally rejects the notion that there was
too little monetary metal in 1279 to justify a groat coinage and argues that the groat was
popular after 1351 because of an increase in urbanization, more wage-earning workers, and
higher wage rates.
Although Grierson’s argument quickly became the conventional wisdom (see Spuﬀord
(1988)), work by Lane and Mueller (1985) and more recently Stahl (2000) has shown that
the grosso was introduced in the early 1190s, before the outﬁtting of the Crusade. That is,
creation of the grosso cannot have been motivated by the need to pay those workers.10
Spuﬀord (1988) argued that the most important diﬀerence in England between 1279,
when the groat was mooted but not minted, and 1351, when it became the most minted silver
coin, was the amount, frequency, and level of urban wage payments. Wages are perhaps the
easiest variable to quantify, and he noted that building-labourer wages were about 9d per
week in 1280 and “in the 1350s their [workers’] wages were in the process of doubling.” He
also argued that there was “probably less coined money in England in 1351 [than in 1279].”
New research has challenged Spuﬀord’s empirical assertions. Robert Allen showed
that building craftsmen in London earned 4d per day in 1279 and 5.3d in 1351.11 It was
10This is not to deny that the popularity of the grosso would have been assisted by the massive inﬂow of
silver (enough to mint 4 million grossi) provided for constructing the Crusaders ﬂeet.
11The data are from a data ﬁle maintained by Robert Allen: “Prices and wages in London and Southern
England, 1259–1914” available at www.nuﬀ.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/london.xls.
18not until 1413 that wages “doubled.” Additionally, Allen (2007)’s work showed exactly the
opposite of Spuﬀord’s assertion about the amount of coined money in England (see Figure
6). Indeed, even in his own later work (Spuﬀord (2002) p. 12), he argued for a much greater
stock of silver (“a twenty-four fold increase”) in 1319 than in the mid-13th century, although
he was not precise about the timing of that increase.
In summary, previous studies have emphasized the importance of rising wages and
numbers of wage workers for the introduction of large silver coins; however, the empirical
evidence is not supportive of this linkage. The evidence does show that the introduction of
large silver coins was preceded by increases in the stock of silver in the economy. Our model
shows that in the face of increased silver stocks, increasing the coin size increases welfare,
and we conclude that the monetary authorities were responding to the larger metal stocks
when they commenced issuing the groats/grossi.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a random matching model of a monetary economy in which
the medium of exchange available to agents is commodity money in the form of potentially
diﬀerent types of silver coins that are distinguishable by the quantity of metal they contain.
The quantity of silver in the economy is assumed to be ﬁxed, but agents are permitted to
adjust the quantities of coins they hold by minting and melting. Coins are assumed to yield
negative direct utility because they are costly to hold, but they are valued because they are
the only objects that agents can trade to obtain consumption. However, uncoined silver can
be held in the form of jewelry that does yield direct utility to the holder.
Although we are unable to obtain analytical results for the model, a numerical analysis
yields these results:
1. In a single coin economy, the optimal size of the coin at ﬁrst increases and then decreases
with the probability that an agent is able to trade.
2. In a single coin economy, the optimal size coin increases with the stock of silver.
3. If coin sizes are chosen optimally, then welfare in an economy with two coins is always
higher than in an economy with a single coin.
4. However, adding a second coin to an economy with an existing coin may increase or
decrease welfare depending on the size of the existing coin.
We then use these predictions of our model to analyze the coinage decisions of the
monetary authorities in Venice and England. Our model provides theoretical support for
the view that decisions about coin sizes and types during the medieval period reﬂected, at
least in part, a desire to improve the economic welfare of the general population, not just
the desire for seigniorage revenue on the part of the sovereign.
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